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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Before us is an uncommon situation in which two 
married criminal defendants—Earl Lafayette Hall, III, and 
Renita Blunt—seek to be re-tried separately so that they may 
each have an opportunity to present their cases without any 
unwarranted constraints on their trial rights. Because each of 
the defendants is entitled to a trial free of unfair prejudice, we 
will reverse the District Court’s denial of each of their motions 
for severance—on grounds distinct to each defendant—and 
vacate Hall and Blunt’s convictions and sentences.  
I. 
Hall and Blunt were convicted of engaging in a scheme 
from January 2013 to June 2015 to collect unemployment 
compensation benefits from federal and state agencies by using 
the identities of military servicepeople. They were appointed 
separate defense counsel at the onset of their case, each of 
whom engaged in extensive motion practice at every stage of 
the trial proceedings. Because Hall and Blunt only challenge 
select motions rulings by the learned District Court, we will 
limit our review to those motions. 
A. Pre-trial Motions 
On November 9, 2016, the Government jointly charged 
Hall and Blunt with twelve counts of mail fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; nine counts of money laundering, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); six counts of 
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1); one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; and one count of conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 
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Hall and Blunt, who had married in March 2016 prior to trial 
proceedings and remained married throughout the proceedings, 
each filed a motion for severance (each, a “Severance Motion”) 
of their trials.  
Blunt filed her Severance Motion on February 23, 2017. 
Hall App. 54. In support of her motion, she argued the 
following: 
Defendant Blunt is confronted with a dilemma: 
she wishes to provide exculpatory testimony on 
her own behalf at trial, but her testimony is likely 
to inculpate her husband, Defendant Hall. As a 
result, a joint trial will force her to choose 
between testifying on her own behalf, which 
testimony is likely to inculpate her husband, or 
not testifying at all in order to avoid testifying 
adversely to her husband. 
Id. at 52. Blunt renewed her Severance Motion prior to jury 
selection.  
In Hall’s Severance Motion, he argued that “if Ms. 
Blunt testifies, it appears her testimony would seriously 
jeopardize Mr. Hall’s right to a fair trial,” and that “Ms. Blunt 
makes clear in her brief that if she testifies, her testimony is 
likely to inculpate her husband.” Id. at 58 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). He cited Blunt’s Brief in Support of 
her Motion for Severance: 
Ms. Blunt will testify that Mr. Hall asked her to 
call the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and 
pretend to be Shawnta Williams (which is the 
name of one of the false unemployment 
5 
compensation claimants), and that she only did 
so after Mr. Hall coerced and threatened her into 
placing the call by telling her that he needed her 
to make the call or else he would be harmed. Mr. 
Hall told her that Williams was not a real person. 
She will testify that Mr. Hall told her what to say 
during the call, and he provided her with 
Williams’ social security number and date of 
birth. She will testify that when she questioned 
Mr. Hall about the Williams phone call, he 
became angry and pushed her, resulting in her 
having a chipped tooth. 
Id. at 59 (quoting Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 93, at 8). The District 
Court denied both Hall and Blunt’s Severance Motions without 
a hearing. Instead, it stated only that it was adopting the 
reasoning set forth in the Government’s response to both 
motions.  
 At a later pre-trial conference, Blunt made an oral 
motion for severance, stating that she was pursuing the motion 
on a new ground of “mutually antagonistic defenses . . . 
[namely,] that [Blunt] acted under duress.” Blunt App. 67. The 
Government argued that the District Court had already 
considered the facts underlying Blunt’s duress argument—the 
threat to compel Blunt’s phone call, the chipped tooth—in 
denying the initial Severance Motion. The District Court did 
not respond on the record to Blunt’s oral motion, but the trial 
proceeded.  
B. Trial Testimony 
 Trial began on March 6, 2017. The Government 
attempted to prove Hall’s involvement in the alleged scheme 
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through recorded telephone calls to public benefits offices. 
While most of the recorded calls were made from Blunt’s cell 
phone, the Government claimed that Hall was actually the 
speaker on all calls but one.  
This exception was a single call in which the speaker 
claimed to be Shawnta Williams. The Government claimed 
that the speaker was Blunt and that Hall could be heard in the 
background. At trial, a probation officer who had supervised 
Hall identified him as the caller in nearly all of the recordings. 
He also testified that he could hear Hall in the background of 
the Shawnta Williams call. Further, wire transfers entered into 
evidence showed that six checks made out to Shawnta 
Williams were deposited into Hall’s checking account.  
Blunt was the final witness to testify at the trial. She 
testified that Hall had access to her phone when the 
incriminating calls were made and that no one other than Hall 
used her phone. She also testified that Hall had used her phone 
to make calls to the Departments of Labor in Pennsylvania and 
Hawaii. Blunt also provided testimony emphasizing Hall’s role 
as the instigator of the scheme compared to her role as a 
reluctant, and sometimes defiant, participant. In the first 
instance—when Blunt was asked if she reported Hall’s activity 
to her probation officer—Hall objected. The following 
conversation ensued at sidebar: 
[HALL’S COUNSEL]: Your honor, I would object. . . . 
I believe [Blunt is] going to testify that she reported to 
her probation officer that Earl Hall was up to his old 
tricks or something to that effect. That is a clear 
reference to his prior convictions prior 404(b) bad acts 
that this court has specifically kept out. 
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[BLUNT’S COUNSEL]: I can proffer that what my 
client and I prepared for her to testify to is that she made 
a report to the probation officer that she was concerned 
about his behavior and that he may be involved in illegal 
activity. I think this is significant for her defense 
because she’s accused in this time period of being a 
coconspirator. . . . I think it’s relevant to her state of 
mind the fact that she had an inkling that he might be 
doing something illegal and she reported it to her 
probation officer. It’s probative of her state of mind and 
important to her defense. 
[HALL’S COUNSEL]: It’s a hearsay statement against 
Mr. Earl, out of court statement, prejudicial, not 
relevant, and would not be admissible in a separate trial. 
I have to renew my motion to sever. 
THE COURT: Well, you’re building up a good case, but 
I’ll permit it, but that is the extent of it. 
Hall App. 270. After this conversation, Blunt testified that she 
reported to her probation officer that “Earl had received a 
phone call from an unknown number. After that phone call he 
just was acting like frantic, like he was afraid of someone.” Id. 
at 271. Her attorney also attempted to elicit testimony that 
Blunt planned on reporting her husband’s activity to a federal 
special agent; however, the District Court limited her 
testimony to the statement that she planned to tell another 
person about her husband’s activity.  
Blunt then admitted that she pretended to be Shawnta 
Williams on one of the recorded phone calls and that she had 
initially refused Hall’s multiple requests that she make the call. 
When she initially refused, Hall “seemed frustrated” and said 
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“there was going to be problems, and then he told me that if I 
didn’t make this call that he was going to kill us.” Id. at 272. 
She testified that she was convinced to make the call when Hall 
said that “people [were] going to bring harm to our family” and 
that they would “pretty much kill us.” Id. She described Hall’s 
demeanor during this exchange as “frustrated, agitated, and . . 
. angry.” Id. 
 The Government also procured testimony from Blunt 
regarding her MagicJack account, a phone application that 
disguises the source of outgoing calls. After entering Blunt’s 
phone records into evidence, the Government was able to 
identify the phone numbers called using Blunt’s MagicJack 
account, including numbers belonging to the Pennsylvania 
Treasury Bureau of Unemployment Compensation 
Disbursements. Blunt confirmed that Hall had access to her 
phone and to the MagicJack account and stated that she had 
only made one of the many calls to the Treasury Bureau. This 
testimony implied that Hall made other calls on her MagicJack 
account. Blunt’s counsel underscored Blunt’s testimony 
against Hall in her closing statement, first with regard to the 
Williams call: 
 [Blunt] told you that it was Mr. Hall who entered 
a number into an app on her phone. That app is 
called the MagicJack app. He typed in the 
number. She didn’t know the number to call. She 
told you that he was there the whole time and he 
told her what to say. . . . Before a phone call was 
ever placed she told you there were several days 
in a row when she was being pressured by Mr. 
Hall to make a phone call . . . . 
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Blunt App. 879. Second, Blunt’s counsel recounted Hall’s 
threats: 
I think [Blunt] described his demeanor as 
frustrated and angry, and then it escalated, and 
after a couple of days of her saying no and him 
continuing to press on the issue, he tells her again 
with an excited, I think her word was angry, 
demeanor, “Look, we’re in danger. There’s 
something bigger going on here. If you do not 
make this call, our family will be harmed.” 
Id. Last, with respect to the phone calls, Blunt’s counsel 
reminded the jury: 
She told you, “He used my phone all the time. 
Yes, it’s my phone, but I gave it to him,” maybe 
she shouldn’t have, but she did. She testified 
very clearly, very firmly that the calls that were 
made to the Department of Labor other than June 
25, 2014 were Mr. Hall. . . . The government 
cannot prove otherwise. Their witness said we 
can’t say who made the calls. 
Id. at 883 (emphasis added).  
 Ultimately, Hall was convicted of multiple counts of 
aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to commit mail fraud 
and was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 116 
months. Blunt was convicted of one count each of aggravated 
identity theft and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and was 
sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of twenty-nine 
months.  
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
Both Hall and Blunt have presented an array of 
procedural and substantive challenges to their convictions. We 
will address their arguments separately. 
A. Earl Hall 
Earl Hall appeals the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for severance and denial of his motion for judgment of 
acquittal. We review a district court’s decision to deny a 
severance motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. 
Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1978). “In reviewing orders 
denying severance . . . , this Court must first determine from 
the record, as it existed when the motion was made, what trial 
developments were then reasonably foreseeable, and in that 
light decide whether the district court abused its discretion in 
denying the severance motion.” United States v. McGlory, 968 
F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992). “[E]ven if the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the severance motion, the 
defendant must pinpoint ‘clear and substantial prejudice’ 
resulting in an unfair trial.” Id. “It is not enough to show that 
severance would have increased the defendant’s chances of 
acquittal.” Id.  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides that a 
court may sever the trial of criminal codefendants “[i]f the 
joinder of . . . defendants . . . or a consolidation for trial appears 
11 
to prejudice a defendant.” 1  Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. “[T]he federal 
system prefers joint trials of defendants who are indicted 
together because joint trials promote efficiency and serve the 
interests of justice by avoiding . . . inconsistent verdicts.” 
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005). The 
Supreme Court has underscored the high bar that must be 
satisfied to set aside that preference. “[A] district court should 
grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk 
that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one 
of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 
judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 
506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). The resulting prejudice from such a 
situation must be “clear and substantial” and must result in a 
“manifestly unfair trial.”2 Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (quoting 
                                                                
1 As a general matter, relevant evidence may cause 
unfair prejudice when it has an “undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one. . . . In reaching a decision 
whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, 
consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or 
lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.” Fed. R. Evid. 
403 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 
2 The Government argues that we should determine 
whether severance is necessary using the test introduced in 
Boscia, 573 F.2d at 832, and reiterated in United States v. 
Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2005) (the “Boscia factors”). 
Under the Boscia factors, a trial court must consider “1) the 
likelihood of codefendants testifying, 2) the degree to which 
such testimony would be exculpatory, 3) the degree to which 
the testifying defendant can be impeached, and 4) judicial 
economy.” Davis, 397 F.3d at 183. However, as evidenced by 
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United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 854 (3d Cir. 
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom United States v. 
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999)). In Zafiro, the 
Supreme Court noted that “[s]uch a risk might occur when 
evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant 
and that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried 
alone is admitted against a codefendant.” 506 U.S. at 539. 
Here, the risk that the Supreme Court foresaw in Zafiro 
has manifested. Hall moved for severance at multiple points in 
the trial proceedings based on evidence that could only be 
admitted through Blunt’s testimony, which she had already 
confirmed in her own motion papers that she planned to give. 
Hall first filed his Severance Motion and a brief in support of 
that motion prior to trial, which described the prejudicial and 
not otherwise available evidence that he believed Blunt would 
submit to the jury. He also quoted Blunt’s own brief in support 
of her Severance Motion in which she confirmed that she 
would be submitting the exact testimony that Hall described in 
his motion. At that point, it should have been reasonably 
foreseeable to the District Court that Blunt would offer 
testimony against Hall that was prejudicial and would not be 
                                                                
the second factor, this test typically has been used to evaluate 
a request for severance on the ground that a co-defendant, who 
would not testify in a joint trial, would present exculpatory 
evidence for the moving defendant in a separate trial. See id.; 
see also Boscia, 573 F.2d at 832 (developing the test in a case 
where a co-defendant planned to offer exculpatory evidence). 
Here, Hall requested severance to prevent a co-defendant from 
presenting prejudicial and incriminating testimony against her 
spouse, the moving defendant, in a joint trial. Therefore, 
Boscia and its progeny are inapposite. 
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otherwise admitted, necessitating the severing of their trials. 
His motion was denied without a hearing.3 
Hall again submitted an oral motion for severance when 
Blunt began to testify consistent with her statements in her 
initial Severance Motion. Again, the District Court denied the 
motion. It instead issued a limiting instruction that curtailed 
Blunt’s testimony on the issue of reporting Hall’s offenses to 
law enforcement.  
Had Blunt’s subsequent testimony been similarly or 
more extensively curtailed, the prejudice to Hall might not be 
so significant as to warrant a reversal. However, the trial 
transcript is rife with Blunt’s testimonial evidence against Hall, 
much of which was prejudicial against him and would not have 
been admitted if Hall had been tried alone and Blunt had been 
able to exercise her spousal privilege. As Blunt foretold in her 
Severance Motion, she testified that Hall had threatened her 
safety; told her there would be problems if she did not comply 
with his request; threatened that “he was going to kill us” and 
“bring harm to our family”; and chipped her tooth when he 
pushed her. Blunt App. 793. These descriptions of threatened 
and actual violence clearly would tend to elicit an inappropriate 
emotional response from the jurors, resulting in unfair 
prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We therefore conclude that 
                                                                
3 Given the prejudicial nature of Blunt’s statements with 
regard to Hall that both defendants previewed in their 
Severance Motions, the better protocol in this case would have 
been for the learned District Court to hold a robust hearing 
prior to trial in which it could elicit the full extent of Blunt’s 
relevant testimony.  
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Blunt’s testimony created a clear and substantial prejudice in 
the minds of the jurors.  
Blunt’s testimony did not only prejudice Hall from an 
emotional standpoint. By way of her testimony, the 
Government was able to support its contention that Hall was 
the speaker on all the recorded phone calls to various 
government entities, save the call in which Blunt admitted to 
impersonating Shawnta Williams. First, it elicited Blunt’s 
confirmation that she had the MagicJack application installed 
on her cell phone. With that foundation, it was able to enter 
Blunt’s MagicJack call log into evidence. From there, the 
Government confirmed that Blunt’s phone—camouflaged by 
the MagicJack application—was used to place the recorded 
phone calls and that Hall had access to Blunt’s phone during 
the period in which the fraudulent calls were placed. Finally, 
Blunt identified Hall as the speaker on all but one of the 
recorded phone calls. Her testimony, coupled with the admitted 
MagicJack log, is exactly the kind of evidence that the 
Supreme Court cautioned against in Zafiro—that is, evidence 
that otherwise would not have been admitted at Hall’s trial 
given Blunt’s representation in her Severance Motion that she 
would exercise her spousal privilege in the event that their 
trials were severed. 
At the end of trial, Hall moved for a mistrial. As 
grounds, Hall’s counsel argued, “I had prior to trial moved for 
a motion to sever based on antagonistic defenses and I think 
that kind of culminated in [Blunt’s] closing with all the 
references to duress directly related to Mr. Hall, evidence that 
would not be admissible in a separate trial.” Blunt App. 903. 
At this point, the District Court had the full benefit of the trial 
record as described above. The prejudice against Hall, both 
from an emotional and evidentiary standpoint, as a result of 
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Blunt’s testimony had been made clear. Even if we afford the 
District Court the latitude implicit in an abuse of discretion 
review and determine that it did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Hall’s pre-trial motion for severance, we are 
compelled to hold that the District Court abused its discretion 
in denying Hall’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of his 
severance argument. Thus, for the reasons described above, we 
will reverse the District Court’s denial of Hall’s motions for 
severance, vacate Hall’s conviction and sentence, and remand 
the case with the instruction that the District Court grant Hall’s 
motion for severance. 
In light of our holding, we need not reach the District 
Court’s denial of Hall’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The 
issue will be dismissed as moot. 
B. Renita Blunt 
 Blunt raises five issues on appeal: (1) whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Blunt’s motion 
for severance; (2) whether the District Court erred by denying 
Blunt’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of duress; 
(3) whether Blunt’s conviction for aggravated identity theft 
should be vacated on inadmissible- or insufficient-evidence 
grounds; (4) whether Blunt’s conviction for conspiracy to 
commit mail fraud should be vacated on insufficient evidence 
grounds; and (5) whether the District Court erred in its 
determination of the loss amount attributable to Blunt.  
We review Blunt’s appeal of the District Court’s denial 
of her Severance Motion under the standard set forth in Part 
III.A, supra.  
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With regard to Blunt’s Severance Motion, we are 
confronted with the issue of whether co-defendant spouses 
being tried jointly are required to have their case severed when 
one spouse must decide between testifying adversely against 
her spouse in her own defense or exercising her privilege 
against adverse spousal testimony. Here, we are compelled to 
afford the holder of spousal privilege the opportunity to 
exercise that privilege without being forced to choose between 
it and the fundamental right to testify on her own behalf. See 
United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“Testimony essential to a spouse’s criminal defense must be 
permitted even if it discloses privileged communications. A 
severance may be granted for a co-defendant spouse, if 
necessary to protect his or her rights.”). Thus, we will reverse 
the District Court’s decision denying Blunt’s Severance 
Motion solely on the ground that Blunt should be given the 
opportunity to exercise her spousal privilege without being 
forced to choose between said exercise and testifying in her 
own defense.4  
                                                                
4 It bears mentioning that courts have not reached a 
consensus on whether a waiver in one case is limited only to 
that case—e.g., “selective” or “limited” waiver—or if it results 
in a permanent waiver with regard to subsequent cases. See, 
e.g., United States v. Artates, No. 12-00826-02, 2013 WL 
321574, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan. 25, 2013) (finding that a husband 
who would testify against his wife in his own trial “would have 
waived any privilege as to that evidence and could not hide 
behind the privilege in the subsequent trial of his wife”). 
While our Court has not spoken to this issue, and need 
not do so here, it is worth noting that we have rejected the 
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It is a longstanding tradition in our jurisprudence that a 
witness has the right to assert or waive spousal privilege when 
given the opportunity to testify against her spouse. Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (“[T]he witness-spouse 
alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness 
may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from 
testifying.”). While our Court has not squarely addressed the 
issue of spousal privilege in the context of a criminal trial in 
which the spouses are co-defendants, analogous cases suggest 
that we should afford it significant protection. In In re 
Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980), we recognized 
that a wife may refuse to testify against her husband before a 
grand jury even when she is alleged to be involved in the 
charged crime. We grounded our holding in public policy 
concerns, namely, that the social benefits of marriage counsel 
against creating strife in a marriage by compelling a witness to 
                                                                
“limited” or “selective” waiver doctrine in other privilege 
contexts. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the 
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the 
limited or selective waiver doctrine in the context of attorney-
client privilege). However, in In re Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 
279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980) we distinguished attorney-client 
communications from adverse spousal testimony on the basis 
that the former prioritized adherence to confidentiality while 
the latter prioritized the preservation of a marriage. Therefore, 
it is unclear under our precedent whether the waiver of spousal 
privilege in one trial would amount to a full waiver, which 
would compel the witness-spouse to testify in any subsequent 
trial. For Blunt, this unsettled law provides an additional 
strategic wrinkle in that she may still be compelled to testify 
against Hall in his trial if she first testifies against him in her 
own. However, that is not one of the issues before us today. 
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testify against her spouse. Id. at 278–80. Later, in Ammar, we 
noted that a severance may be granted to a co-defendant spouse 
in order to protect her right to testify in her own defense.5 714 
F.2d at 257.  
Blunt clearly was compelled to waive her privilege and 
testify in her own defense at trial. She stated in her initial 
motion for severance that she was being made to choose 
between preserving her spousal privilege and providing 
exculpatory testimony on her own behalf. At a pre-trial 
conference, she stated to the District Court that she would be 
compelled to raise a “mutually antagonistic defense” of duress 
in her trial testimony due to Hall’s refusal to stipulate to certain 
facts prior to trial. At trial, Blunt did indeed testify in her own 
defense. However, even after being compelled to choose to 
exercise her right to testify over her right to exercise spousal 
privilege, Blunt was prevented from exercising fully her right 
to testify in her own defense. Her testimony was curtailed in an 
attempt to prevent the jury from hearing prejudicial statements 
                                                                
5 Ammar ultimately held that the marital 
communications privilege—distinct from the adverse spousal 
testimony privilege—contains an exception for 
communications pertaining to ongoing or future criminal 
activity involving both spouses. Such an exception does not 
apply here. As we explained in Ammar, “The privilege against 
adverse spousal testimony, which prevents one spouse from 
being compelled to testify against the other, rests with the 
testifying spouse, who may choose to waive it. This privilege . 
. . applies to all testimony of any kind. In contrast, the marital 
communications privilege prevents a testifying spouse from 
disclosing confidential communications between the spouses.” 
714 F.2d at 258. 
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against Hall. For example, Blunt’s counsel proffered at sidebar 
that Blunt would testify that she intended to report Hall’s 
suspicious activities to a federal special agent. That 
testimony—implying a fear so severe that Blunt planned to 
reach out to law enforcement—would have probative value 
with regard to her duress defense, but its admission was 
prohibited due to the likely prejudice to Hall. In sum, Blunt 
was entitled to exercise both of the rights at issue here, but she 
ultimately was unable to exercise either in a satisfactory 
manner.6 We therefore will reverse the District Court’s denial 
of Blunt’s Severance Motion. 
We now turn to Blunt’s argument that the District Court 
erred in denying her request for a jury instruction on the 
defense of duress. Because we are vacating Blunt’s conviction 
and sentence, we need not address the substance of her 
argument on this point. We note only that, should Blunt testify 
fully at her severed trial and raise this request once more, the 
District Court should consider anew whether the defense is 
available in light of her unencumbered testimony. 
Blunt’s remaining challenges to the District Court’s 
rulings all relate to her conviction and sentence for various 
offenses. Because we are vacating Blunt’s conviction and 
sentence and remanding her case to the District Court for trial 
severance proceedings, the challenged rulings have been 
                                                                
6 Again, the District Court would have benefitted from 
a robust pre-trial hearing in which Blunt’s relevant testimony 
could have been elicited in full. The hearing would have put 
the District Court on notice of the testimony on which Blunt 
intended to rely, foreshadowing the conflict between Blunt’s 
right to testify in her own defense and Hall’s right to a trial free 
of unwarranted prejudice.  
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rendered immaterial. We therefore see no reason to address 
them here and dismiss them as moot. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of Hall’s Severance Motion and Blunt’s 
Severance Motion. We will vacate Hall’s and Blunt’s 
convictions and sentences, and we will remand the case to the 
District Court with the instruction that it grant Hall’s motion 
for severance and Blunt’s motion for severance on the grounds 
provided in this Opinion. We will dismiss as moot the parties’ 
appeals of the District Court’s denial of Hall’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal; its denial of Blunt’s request to instruct 
the jury on the defense of duress; its denial of Blunt’s motion 
for a directed verdict on the charges of aggravated identity theft 
and conspiracy to commit mail fraud; and its determination of 
the loss amount attributable to Blunt. 
